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Participation in Governance from a
Comparative Perspective:
Citizen Involvement in
Telecommunications and Electricity in




This paper draws on empirical research to compare modes of citizen partici-
pation in administrative actions among the United States and three European
countries: the United Kingdom, France and Sweden.
I
An important value for modem governments is citizen participation.2 Many
believe that increased citizen involvement will solve many problems facing cur-
rent administrative agencies. 3 Scholars suggest that participation can improve the
legitimacy of agencies, improve decision-making, and provide benefits to the
participating citizens.
4
In both Europe and the United States, agencies have been experimenting with
different forms of increased participation. However, the starting point and the
mechanisms adopted in Europe were, in many respects, different than the reality
in the United States of the twenty-first century. This paper examines what was
* Associate Professor of Law, UC-Hastings, College of the Law. I would like to thank Frederic
Carteron, Miriam Engstrom, David Jung, Shelley Kennedy, Ethan Lieb, and Pillar Stillwater for their
comments on previous drafts of this paper, or on its contents, in discussions with me. I would also like
to thank the organizers of the Collaborative Governance Conference, and especially David Jung and
Chris Knowlton, for giving me the chance to complete and present the paper, and to the conference
participants for insightful comments.
1. 1 also address, to some degree, industry participation, but the focus is on citizens.
2. See B. GuY PETERS, THE FUTURE OF GOVERNING. FOUR EMERGING MODELS 21-71 (1996).
3. ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 3, 61-64 (2004).
4. See PAUL HIRST, ASSOCIATIVE DEMOCRACY: NEW FORMS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
GOVERNANCE, 15-44 (1994); CHRISTOPHER HOOD, THE ART OF THE STATE, 120-142 (2d ed., 2000);
Mariano-Florentino Cu6llar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411 (2005); Arc-
hon Fung, Varieties of Participation in Complex Government, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66 (2006). But see
Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy?, in ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE 93, 106-113 (Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001); BRONWEN MORGAN, SOCIAL
CITIZENSHIP IN THE SHADOW OF COMPErITION: THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS OF REGULATORY
JUSTIFICATION 215-220 (2003) (for a discussion of the forms of participation that actually have an
impact, and suggesting they are of a specific variety); Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rule-
making: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943 (2006) (for doubts about the effectiveness of
participation).
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done to increase citizen participation in the telecommunications and electricity
sectors in the United Kingdom, France, and Sweden. The emphasis will be mostly
on mechanisms voluntarily adopted by agencies in these countries, but I will also
examine some that were imposed on agencies through law or through the political
branches. However, since all of these mechanisms were adopted in a top-down
fashion (whether through the agency or through government), the focus will be on
what the agency/government actors wanted to achieve through themn--what their
goals were--rather than focusing on the goals in terms of citizens' moral devel-
opment.
The data used in this paper were collected during a field study of the electrici-
ty and telecommunications regulators in those three European countries. The
sources used are a wealth of internal and external documents-both in hard copy
and on the Web-produced by the agencies and by other actors, in addition to
qualitative, semi-structured interviews with more than 100 people.5
Since the goal is to compare the European experiments with those adopted in
the United States, the paper is structured around that comparison. This part intro-
duces the issues and the methodology. Part II provides a brief description of the
case studies, addressing similarities and differences among the European coun-
tries. Part III then discusses several mechanisms considered necessary to partici-
pation in the United States that have been rejected by the agencies in the European
countries. Part IV describes the parallels, though it also points out differences
between the countries individually, as well as between them and the United States
collectively. Part V describes mechanisms that go beyond the prevailing practice
in the United States. The paper concludes that the European agencies made sub-
stantial efforts to increase their transparency and increase participation, but the
content and the success of the efforts varied across countries, strongly influenced
by the institutional structure surrounding the agencies.
HI. THE CASE STUDIES
The six agencies at the center of this paper are those in the United Kingdom
(Oftel and later Ofcom for telecommunications; Offer and later Ofgem for elec-
tricity);6 in Sweden (PTS for Telecommunications and STEM for energy); 7 and
France (ART and later ARCEP for telecommunications; CRE for energy).8 Their
names and years of creation are summarized in Table 1.
5. The interviews were conducted in accordance with the confidentiality requirements of the Com-
mittee for Protection of Human Subjects at the University of California, Berkeley. Accordingly,
throughout the article, the interviews are referred to only by the institutional affiliation of the interview
subjects in order to maintain confidentiality. All of the interviews are on file with the author.
6. Oftel is the Office of Telecommunications, later Ofcom, the Office of Communications; Offer is
the Office of Electricity Supply Regulation, later Ofgem, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets.
7. Post-och Telestyrelsen, the Swedish National Post and Telecom Agency, is PTS; Energimyndig-
heten, the Swedish Energy Agency, is STEM.
8. ART is l'Autorit6 De Regulation Des T6lcommunications, or the authority for regulating tele-
communications, later I'Autorit6 De R6gulation Des Communications tlectroniques et De Poste, or the
authority for regulating electronic communications and the postal service, ARCEP. CRE is the Com-
mission de Regulation d'nergie, the commission for the regulation of energy.
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Table 1: Basic Information about Agencies Researched
Telecommunications Electricity
U.K. Oftel (1984-2003) Offer (1989-1999)
Ofcom (2003-present) Ofgem (2000-present)
France ART (1997-2005) CRE (2000-present)
ARCEP (2005-present)
Sweden PTS (1993-present) STEM (1998-present)
These agencies have both advantages and disadvantages as case studies. One
major advantage is the fact that the agencies are motivated to experiment with
new mechanisms of participation for a number of reasons. First, these agencies
are relatively new, and in Britain and France, they also they represent a new and
untried mode of regulation.9 They, therefore, had fewer obstacles to experiment-
ing with new models of regulation-less path dependency that, as demonstrated
by institutional literature, could make them harder to change. 1° Since they were
created at an age when, as explained above, governance and participation were the
new and exciting thing in public administration, it was natural for them to adopt
these new modes of decision-making.I
Beyond that, the agencies work in an environment that is very much oriented
towards Europe as a source of governance. The laws governing them were passed
in compliance with E.U. directives; 12 parts of their work involve reporting to and
9. See Mark Thatcher, Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pressures, Functions and
Contextual Mediation, 25 W. EUR. POL. 125 (2002); Mark Thatcher, Regulation after Delegation:
Independent Regulatory Agencies in Europe, 9 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 954 (2002); Mark Thatcher & Alec
Stone Sweet, Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions, 25 W. EUR. POL. 1
(2002).
10. See generally JOHN L. CAMPBELL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION (2004); W.
RICHARD SCOTT ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS: FROM
PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE TO MANAGED CARE (2000); Paul Pierson, From Expansion to Austerity:
The New Politics of Taxing and Spending, in SEEKING THE CENTER: POLITICS AND POLICYMAKING AT
THE NEW CENTURY 54-80 (Martin A. Levin, et al. eds., 2001); Tim Bartley & Marc Schneiberg, Ratio-
nality and Institutional Contingency: The Varying Politics of Economic Regulation in the Fire Insur-
ance Industry, 45 SOC. PERSP. 47, (2002); Peter Evans, Development as Institutional Change: the
Pilfalls of Monocropping and the Potentials of Deliberation, 38 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 30 (2004);
Richard Freeman & Michael Moran, Reforming Health Care in Europe, 23 W. EURO. POL. 35 (2000);
Christopher Pollitt, Clarifying Convergence: Striking Similarities and Durable Differences in Public
Management Reform, 4 PUB. MGMT. REV. 471 (2002); Gerard Roland, Understanding Institutional
Change: Fast-Moving and Slow-Moving Institutions, 38 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 109 (2004).
11. This is clearly a very simplified version of the process of creating the new agencies and their
experimentation with more participatory mechanisms. For studies looking closely at the development
of British regulators' experiments with participatory mechanisms and a detailed discussion of the role
of such mechanisms, see COSMO GRAHAM, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL
APPROACH (2000); CLARE HALL ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION: CULTURE, CHAOS AND
INTERDEPENDENCE INSIDE THE REGULATORY PROCESS (2000); TONY PROSSER, LAW AND THE
REGULATORS (1997). For a collection of studies of the French regulatory agencies, see MARIE-ANNE
FRISON-ROCHE, RESPONSABILITE ET REGULATIONS tCONOMIQUES § 5 (2007).
12. The most current set of directives in telecommunications includes the communication package,
which is composed of six directives and a resolution. See Europe's Information Society, Regulatory
No. 21
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receiving approval from the E.U. commission; 13 and the agencies have a European
regulators' network that meets several times a year and runs an email list used by
the regulators as a discussion board. The regulators participating in the board
compare notes and discuss best practices in regulations, during which there is an
informal competition as to their relative reputations. 14 The European Union pro-
motes and experiments with various kinds of governance mechanisms, such as the
Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 15 and Comitology. 16  That ap-
proach-encouraging innovation and collaborative governance---has an influence
on the agencies.
Finally, in the United Kingdom and France (but not in Sweden, as will be de-
scribed below), the agencies in question were new creations, outside the tradition-
al civil-service structure. They, therefore, had to create their legitimacy, both
towards the traditional administration and towards the public. The traditional
accountability justification of government by elected officials, however weak and
doubtful even when used by civil servants in the regular ministerial departments,
cannot apply to these independent agencies. They had to find new ways to legi-
timize themselves. 17
Using participatory mechanisms served two purposes. First, it created an al-
ternate source of legitimacy for these non-elected institutions. In essence, they
can say, "We may not be elected, but we are transparent and responsive, which is
Framework for Telecoms in the EU Today, http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/policy/
ecomm/current/indexen.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2009). The energy sector is governed by Directive
96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 Concerning Common
Rules For The Internal Market In Electricity, 1996 O.J. (L 27) 1, and added to by Directive
2003/54/EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Of 26 June 2003 Concerning Common
Rules For The Internal Market In Electricity And Repealing Directive 96/92/EC, 2003 O.J. (L176).
See Europe's Information Society, Regulatory Framework for Telecoms in the EU Today,
http://europa.eullegislation-summaries/energy/european-energy-policy/l27005-en.htm (last visited
Oct. 23, 2009).
13. For example, the market analysis process that the telecommunications agencies have been re-
quired to undertake involves getting the European Commission's approval for two steps of the process.
JOACHIM SCHERER, ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION LAW AND POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2005).
14. Interview with members of ART, in Paris, France, (Dec. 17, 2004); interviews with members of
PTS, in Stockholm, Sweden (Sept. 7, Oct. 15, 2004)); interview with members of STEM, in Eskiltuna,
Sweden (Sept. 27, 2004); interview with members of Ofgem, in London, England (Dec. 1, 2004). This
network can itself be seen as an aspect of "new governance," and fits in nicely with Slaughter's analy-
sis of the role of network in the modem world. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER
(2004). However, since the focus of the paper is on mechanisms allowing participation by private
actors, I am not addressing the role of networks in a new governance framework-it is beyond the
scope of this article.
15. See European Union Center of Excellence, OMC Forum, http://eucenter.wisc.edu/omc/ (last
visited October 31, 2009); Tamara K. Hervey, The European Union and the Governance of Health
Care, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, 179 (Grinne de Btirca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2006); Claire Kilpatrick, New EU Employment Governance and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND
NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, 121 (Grdinne de Btirca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Neil
Walker, EU Constitutionalism and New Governance, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND
THE US, (Grdinne de Btirca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
16. C. JOERGES, "Good Governance" Through Comitology?, in EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL
REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS, 311 (1999).
17. See GRAHAM, supra note 11, at 38 (regulators act in innovative ways to increase transparency)
and 92-95 (regulators made use of consumer committees to give voice to consumers to increase legiti-
macy); Tony Prosser, Regulating Public Enterprises, 2001 PUB. L. 505 (2001).
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more than you can say for the regular elected branches."' 8 And all of the agencies
do indeed stress the large number of consultations with stakeholders and their
transparency as sources of legitimacy.' 9 In France, for example, transparency and
participation are used by the newly created independent administrative agencies to
severe or dilute their traditional links with the core civil service.
Second, the agencies can and do call on public support and use it in cases
where they do not have support from the government, are defying established
ministries, or going against the established state incumbent. For example, the
French energy regulator publishes avis, or opinions, that can be used by Parlia-
ment members to oppose the wishes of the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and
Employment regulating the sector.20 Similarly, the British telecommunications
regulator, Oftel, used support from customer organizations and favorable media
coverage in putting in action its decision to regulate mobile phone termination
prices.21
We can therefore expect a high level of innovation and experimentation with
participation mechanisms from the agencies.
On the other hand, the areas these agencies regulate present at least two ob-
stacles to public participation. The first obstacle is the nature of utility sectors.
The issues the regulators handle are technically complex, and it may, therefore, be
difficult for members of the public to participate. Lay people often find agency
materials hard to understand even when the agency is attempting to reach out. For
example, the British National Consumer Council wrote the following about a con-
sultation by Oftel:
[C]omplexity of subject matter is not an excuse for impenetrability. It is
also regrettable that the [consultation] document does not contain a clear
consumer impact assessment .... Oftel needs to address how it presents
information in consultation documents as a matter of urgency, both in
22terms of comprehensibility and format.
Similarly, when responding to a consultation by Ofgem, the Friends of the
Lake District, a consumer organization, observed, "With reference to the consulta-
tion documents, it might be beneficial to provide a Plain English Summary ver-
18. None of the agencies actually say it that way, but Graham makes the argument in his study of the
British regulators. See GRAHAM, supra note 11, at 63.
19. Interviews with members of the Swedish Telecomunications Agency, PTS, in Stockholm, Swe-
den (Sept. 7, 15, 23; and Oct. 7, 2004); interview with members of STEM, in Eskiltuna, Sweden (Sept.
27, 2004); interviews with members of Ofcom (previously Oftel), in London, England (Oct. 26, Nov.
10, 2004); interviews with members of Ofgem, in London, England (Oct. 20, Dec. 1, 2004); interviews
with members of ART, in Paris, France (Dec. 8, 2004).
20. Interviews with members of CRE, in Paris, France (Dec. 16, 2004); interview with a former
member of CRE, in France (Jan. 26, 2005) (a more accurate location is omitted to preserve intervie-
wee's anonymity); interview with members of General Directorate for Energy and Raw Materials in
the Ministry of Industry, in Paris, France (Jan. 26, 2005).
21. Interview with members of Ofcom (previously Oftel), in London, England (Oct. 26, 2004);
interview with members of PUAF (the Public Utility Access Forum), in London, England (Nov. 15,
2004).
22. NATIONAL CONSUMER COUNCIL, REVmW OF PRICE CONTROL ON CALLS To MOBILE PHONES:
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sion to explain the main issues for those outside the industry who would like to
respond. 23
These critiques reflect unhappiness with the way the agencies present the ma-
terials, but they also stem from the nature of the subjects themselves. They often
involve issues that require a lot of explanation, and getting from the public the
level of commitment required for understanding the issues and providing mea-
ningful feedback is not easy.
The second obstacle is that utility issues tend to be invisible unless there is a
problem with them. This is ironic, because in modem life, our dependence upon
electricity and telecommunications is extensive. Electricity powers our most basic
working tools. It is often used to heat buildings in winter. It lets us see in dark
buildings and spaces, cook on electric stoves, watch TV, and charge our cell
phones. Many businesses depend on electronic communications to func-
tion-Intemet and phone services, for example-and individuals in developed
countries are used to always being "in touch."
But people tend not to interest themselves in the workings of the sector unless
there is a crisis or scandal-a blackout, an energy crisis, or a collapse of a net-
work. Professor Chevalier from (among other places) l'Universitd de Paris IX
Dauphine talked about "lafie de l'9ectricit," or the "electricity fairy," which is
invisible until it stops doing its magic for us.
24
This means getting people involved in the routine running of the utility sec-
tors is not easy. Involvement tends to be limited to subject-specific consumer
organizations (for example, in the United Kingdom, the Public Utilities Access
Forum, PUAF, is an association of organization fighting for access to utilities for
low-income consumers) 25 or to limited numbers of employees in general consum-
er organizations. 26 Consumer organizations openly admit that they have limited
resources to invest in the sectors and probably miss some of the important issues,
even when they are focused on the sector. For example, a representative of an
organization promoting consumer interests in relation to utilities in the United
Kingdom told me, when I asked why they did not comment on an electricity dis-
tribution price review, that:
There are an awful lot of consultations, and that was probably an impor-
tant one that we should have responded to .... The distribution price
controls was all very abstract and we didn't quite get what it's about and
23. Letter from Carol Douglas, Project Officer, Friends of the Lake District, to Paul O'Donovan,
Ofgem (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/ElecDistPriceCntrls/
DPCR4/Documentsl/10934-9105_Fld.pdf.
24. Interview with Professor Jean-Marie Chevalier, l'Universitd de Paris IX Dauphine, in Paris,
France (Jan. 2, 2005).
25. Information about PUAF can be seen on their website. Public Utilities Access Forum,
http://www.puaf.org.uk/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
26. For example, when I interviewed members of the National Consumer Council they mentioned
three employees, one of whom was on maternity leave, who regularly handled utility issues. Interview
with members of the National Consumer Council, in London, England (Nov. 16, 2004).
27. Interview with a member of PUAF (the Public Utility Access Forum), in Bristol, England (Nov.
24, 2004); interview with members of the National Consumer Council, in London, England (Nov. 16,
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then quite late on we realized it was actually quite important, and it's just
one of those--we don't have enough time for things, and when that reali-
zation hit us we were all buried under a lot of other work so I'm afraid
that's one we missed. But we will probably rue the day.
28
On the other hand, in times of crises, there is often political outcry and strong
condemnation of industry in the sector. However, the citizen input tends to be
accusatory, rather than constructive problem solving, which may fit more with old
government than new collaborative governance.
29
For these reasons, creating participatory mechanisms that work for routine is-
sues and at the same time remain functional over the extended time needed to
make decisions on complex issues is not easy.
Beyond these similarities, there are, unsurprisingly, substantial differences
between the three countries--the United Kingdom, France, and Sweden-both in
terms of the liberalization process (i.e., the speed and extent to which the market
was opened to competition) and in terms of the political and administrative struc-
ture and tradition in which the agencies exist.30 These differences are important to
understanding the different forms of participation used by each country. A short
introduction to each country's liberalization process and the relevant aspects of
the political and administrative culture is provided below, in chronological order
of liberalization, from the earliest liberalizer (the United Kingdom) to the most
recent (France).31
28. Interview with a member of PUAF (the Public Utility Access Forum), in Bristol, England (Nov.
24, 2004).
29. William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in LAW AND
NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 15, at 37.
30. For further discussion, see MARK THATCHER, THE POLITICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, CONVERGENCE AND CHANGE (1999) (on England and France's liberaliza-
tion of telecommunications); Lennart Hjalmarsson, From Club Regulation to Market Competition in
the Scandinavian Electricity Supply Industry, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICITY
REGULATION 126 (Richard J. Gilbert & Edward P. Kahn eds., 1996) (on electricity in Sweden);
MAGNUS KARLSSON, THE LIBERALISATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN SWEDEN: TECHNOLOGY
AND REGIME CHANGE FROM THE 1960S TO 1993 (1998) (Ph.D. dissertation, Linkoping University) (for
telecommunications liberalization in Sweden); Stephen Thomas, Evaluating the British Model of
Electricity Deregulation, 75 ANNALS OF PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 367 (2004) (on British electrici-
ty); Nicolas Charbit, Country Report: France, in THE LIBERALIZATION OF ELECTRICITY AND
NATURAL GAS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 123 (Damien Geradin ed., 2001) (on electricity in France);
see also Dorit Rubinstein, Regulatory Accountability: Telecommunications and Electricity Agencies in
the UK, France and Sweden (Spring 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley) (on file with author) (for a comparison between the three countries). However, for a view
that there are strong similarities in development in addition to differences, see Ian Bartle, When Institu-
tions No Longer Matter: Reform of Telecommunications and Electricity in Germany, France and
Britain, 22 J. OF PUB. POL'Y 1 (2002).
31. For further reading on the liberalization process, see Bartle supra note 30; PETER CAMERON &
MICHAEL BROTHWOOD, COMPETITION IN ENERGY MARKETS: LAW AND REGULATION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (2002); Martin Cave & Luigi Prosperetti, The Liberalization of European Tele-
communications, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS ON TWO SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC (Martin Cave & Robert
W. Crandall eds., 2001); Richard Green, Electricity Liberalisation in Europe-How Competitive Will It
Be?, 34 ENERGY POL'Y 2532 (2006); DIETER HELM, ENERGY, THE STATE, AND THE MARKET: BRITISH
ENERGY POLICY SINCE 1979 (2004); Hjalmarsson, supra note 30; WILLEM HULSINK, PRIVATISATION
AND LIBERALISATION IN EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: COMPARING BRITAIN, THE
NETHERLANDS, AND FRANCE (1999); Lars Hultkrantz, Telecommunications Liberalisation in Sweden:
Is "Intermediate" Regulation Viable?, 9 SWEDISH ECON. POL'Y REV. 133 (2003); Nicolas Jabko &
7
Reiss: Reiss: Participation in Governance
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom was the first country in Europe to liberalize32 its utility
sectors, starting with telecommunications. The British telecommunications in-
cumbent was privatized in 1984, and the sector was opened to competition in
1991. 33 Oftel, the regulator of the sector, was created together with the initial
reform, in 1984. Liberalization of other utility sectors followed: electricity was
liberalized in 1989, and the Office of Electricity Supply Regulation (Offer) was
created. 34 Offer merged with the gas regulator (Ofgas) to form the Gas and Elec-
tricity Market Regulator (Ofgem) in 1999. 35 These liberalizations were done as
part of general market-oriented reforms put in place by the Thatcher government,
and were controversial.36
The British independent regulators are known throughout Europe as leaders
in liberalization. Other countries look to their innovations in regulations.37 As the
first regulators, they had substantial time to experiment with different participato-
ry mechanisms and evaluate regulation and accountability in a very sophisticated
manner. However, as the first to regulate, they also ran first into some of the pit-
falls of regulation-rising prices in electricity and gas, manipulation of prices by
large production companies, and dealing with large, sophisticated incumbents in
both electricity and telecommunications. 38 In some cases, the agencies came un-
der strong political and media attack, and some of the mechanisms
adopted--especially by Ofgem--were put in place in direct response to such at-
tacks as a way to deal with criticism and loss of a sense of legitimacy. According-
Rainer Eising, Moving Targets: National Interests and Electricity Liberalization in the European
Union, 34 COMP. POL. STUD. 742 (2001); Tooraj Jamasb & Michael Pollitt, Electricity Market Reform
in the European Union: Review of Progress Toward Liberalization & Integration, 26 THE ENERGY J.
11 (2005), working paper version available at http://tisiphone.mit.edu/RePEc/mee/wpaper/2005-
003.pdf; Karlsson, supra note 30; Helena Lindskog, The Telecommunications Market In Sweden From
Monopoly to Competition, presentation at the 2004 Applied Business Research Conference, San Juan
Puerto Rico (2004) available at http://www.heldag.com/articles/Telecom%20market%20ABR%
202004%20%20H%20Lindskog.pdf; FRANCOIS SOULT, EDF CHRONIQUE D'UN DISASTRE
INELUCTABLE (2003); David Coen & Mark Thatcher, The National Politics of European Regulation:
Institutional Reform in Telecommunications, in UTILITIES REFORM IN EUROPE (Susan Boriotti et
al.eds., 2001); THATCHER, THE POLITICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 30; Mark Thatcher,
Winners and Losers in Europeanisation: Reforming the National Regulation of Telecommunications,
27 W. EUR. POL. 284 (2004); Thomas, supra note 30; Leonard Waverman & Esen Sirel, European
Telecommunications Markets on the Verge of Full Liberalization, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 113 (1997);
Rubinstein, supra note 30, chapter 2, pp. 35-74 (describing liberalization in detail).
32. 1 am focusing on liberalization, i.e., opening a sector to competition, and not privatization be-
cause while not all the countries in Europe privatized or intend to privatize their utilities, all of them
have opened the sectors to competition, whether willingly or because of E.U. directives. The debate on
the comparative effects of liberalization v. privatization is beyond the scope of this paper.
33. See PROSSER, supra note 11; MARK THATCHER, THE POLITICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, CONVERGENCE AND CHANGE IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE (1999); C.D.
FOSTER, PRIVATIZATION, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND THE REGULATION OF NATURAL MONOPOLY (1992).
34. PROSSER, supra note 11; GRAHAM, supra note 11.
35. GRAHAM, supra note 11.
36. See PROSSER, supra note 11; GRAHAM, supra note 11.
37. Interviews with members of PTS, in Stockholm, Sweden (Sept. 7, 2004); interview with mem-
bers of STEM, in Eskiltuna, Sweden (Sept. 27, 2004); interview with a member of Orange, France, in
Paris, France (Jan. 28, 2005).
38. See PROSSER, supra note 11; GRAHAM, supra note 11.
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ly, the agencies' mechanisms are now aimed primarily at increasing transparency
and giving stakeholders a voice, rather than at achieving consensus (although the
regulators make an effort to cooperate with industry on many issues).39
The first independent agency, the Office of Fair Trade (OFT), was established
in 1973. The structure and regulatory framework provided for all the other utility
regulators--Oftel, Offer, Ofgas-was, with slight variation, a repetition of the
OFT model; regulators examined here were modeled after it.40 Their situation in
terms of accountability to the ministry in charge of utility sectors--the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry---has always been a bit blurry; they are independent,
but the ministry is responsible to Parliament for what they do. This is reflected in
the recent review of accountability of independent agencies by the House of
Lords. 41 In that review, the concerns about traditional accountability were ans-
wered by a new model of accountability, "360-degree" accountability, which ac-
knowledged that regulators were, and should be, accountable in many directions
and through many mechanisms. 42 The idea was that while agencies are not ac-
countable directly to ministers in the traditional sense, they are accountable
through procedures ensuring responsiveness to stakeholders and transparency.
43
Indeed, Oftel (later imitated by the other regulators) emphasized consultation and
transparency and made most of its decisions through meetings with stakeholders
and intensive public consultation.
44
B. Sweden
Like the United Kingdom, Sweden was a relatively early liberalizer, opening
its telecommunications market to competition in 1993 and its electricity market in
1998. However, the process of liberalization in Sweden was much more consen-
sual--at least in telecommunications. 45 This meant that the regulatory system put
in place was, in its first stages, based on a high level of trust and cooperation be-
tween industry, the regulators, and the consumer industry, and the need for addi-
tional participation mechanisms was not felt as strongly.
46
In addition, the created agencies were nothing unusual. Sweden has a tradi-
tion of independent agencies dating back to its 1809 constitution. They are gener-
ally autonomous and rich in staff and resources. The constitution forbids political
interference in their activities, other than passing regulations and laws, and there is
a constitutional convention enforcing that prohibition.4 7 This means that the rela-
39. PROSSER, supra note 11.
40. Id. at 60.
41. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, THE REGULATORY STATE: ENSURING ITS
ACCOUNTABILITY, 2003-4, H.L. 68-1, at 5.
42. See id. at TT 48-49 (reflecting ideas described in Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory
State, 27 J.L. & SOC'Y. 38, (2000)).
43. See id. at T $ 19-23.
44. CLARE HALL, ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION: CULTURE, CHAOS AND
INTERDEPENEDENCE INSIDE THE REGULATORY PROCESS, 48-53 (2000).
45. See Hjalmarsson, supra note 30; Karlsson, supra note 30; Lindskog, supra note 31.
46. See Hjalmarsson, supra note 30; Rubinstein, supra note 30, at 159.
47. HUGH HECLO & HENRIK MADSEN, POLICY AND POLITICS IN SWEDEN: PRINCIPLED
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tionship between agencies and government is well-established, and the agencies
did not need to establish their legitimacy in the same way as their French and
British counterparts had to.
Furthermore, even before the creation of these agencies, Sweden had a tradi-
tion of consultation and extensive open government laws. 48 Therefore, much that
was new and exciting for the British and French agencies in terms of increasing
participation and transparency was, for the Swedish agencies, simply business as
usual. They did add participation mechanisms-for example, as will be described
below, advice mechanisms for consumers, partnership with industry, and online
consultations open to anyone 49-but many of the ideas of open government, con-
sultation, and government by consensus were already in place.
Finally, unlike its British or French counterparts, Swedish government enjoys
a high level of trust from its citizens (although it declined in the 1980s and 1990s,
to a degree where Swedish scholars talk of a crisis of legitimacy); 50 trust in gov-
ernment is still very high compared to other democracies. 51 Therefore, Swedish
agencies are not subject to substantial pressures to increase participation. 52
C. France
France was a late liberalizer; both in telecommunications and in electricity,
the market was liberalized after, not before, the enactment of E.U. directives. In
both cases it only opened the full market to competition at (and not before) the
final deadline the directives set.53 In terms of participation mechanisms, this gave
France both a disadvantage and an advantage compared to other European coun-
tries. On the one hand, it started late, and therefore it is still adjusting to some of
the mechanisms other countries have been using for years. French decision-
making in these sectors started with the decision-making process of three actors:
the ministry, the agency, and the incumbent company, or the "national cham-
pion." 54 Under these circumstances, including other actors in industry-from both
the sector's industry (i.e., telecommunication operators or electricity operators)
and other industries-was an expansion and should be regarded as a substantial
48. HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 47; Yates, supra note 47. But see infra notes 94-99 and accom-
panying text about the extent and openness of consultations.
49. See discussion infra § V.B.
50. HECLO & MADSEN supra note 47; Jon Pierre, Legitimacy, Institutional Change, and the Politics
of Public Administration in Sweden, 14 INTER'L POL. SCI. REV. 387 (1993); Olof K. Ruin, The Duality
of the Swedish Central Administration: Ministries and Central Agencies, in HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE AND DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (Ali Farazmand ed., 2001).
51. See SEOK-EUN KIM, The Role of Trust in the Modem Administrative State: An Integrative Mod-
el, 37 ADMIN & SoC'Y 611(2005).
52. Under the approach that participation mechanisms are a response to failures and problems of
traditional government mechanisms. See Fung, supra note 4.
53. And there is a debate ongoing about whether it was a willing or reluctant liberalizer. See Bartle,
supra note 30, HULSINK, supra note 31; JABKO & EISING, supra note 31; SOULT, supra note 31;
THATCHER, supra note 30.
54. THATCHER, supra note 30 at 255-256; interviews with members of ART, in Paris, France (Dec.
8, 2004); interviews with members of CRE, in Paris, France (Jan. 10, 2005); interviews with a former
member of CRE, in France (Jan. 26, 2005) (location omitted to preserve interviewee's anonymity).
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change. Citizen participation is still in very early stages on most issues. On the
other hand, as a latecomer, France could anticipate some of the problems the other
countries faced without advanced preparation. Indeed, in a number of areas,
France made clever use of sophisticated participation mechanisms to overcome
such problems.56
The independent agencies are new phenomena in France, and the administra-
tive apparatus is still adjusting to them. Many questions as to their roles and pow-
ers are still open. 57 However, in the case of the telecommunications and electrici-
ty agencies, it is clear they are somewhat outside the general administrative struc-
ture. While most of their members are civil servants and not independent contrac-
tors,58 and while most of them went to the Grands Ecoles and are members of the
Grands Corps,59 they are not quite part of the traditional civil service. Unlike
traditional civil servants, members of these new agencies also face pressures from
their European colleagues and the Commission to assert their independence and
achieve goals that are not necessarily in line with the ministry or the incumbent.
The French energy regulator (CRE)6° has clashed more than once with EDF,
the national electricity company, and with the ministry. While the French tele-
communications regulator (ART) 62 enjoyed substantial support from the ministry,
it was attacked by Parliament members and (almost inevitably) clashed with
France Telecom, the incumbent telecommunications company. 63 In those strug-
55. There is strong union involvement in opposing privatization, mostly because of concerns about
layoffs and the status of employees in the former incumbents. But they have very little involvement in
most other issues in the sector. Dominic Di-Natale, French Unions Attack Privatisation Plans (B.B.C.
News broadcast, July 18, 2003), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3077439.stm. Michel
Berne & Gerard Pogorel, Privatization Experiences in France 21 (CESifo Working Paper Series No.
1195, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=559965.
56. See discussion infra § V.A.
57. See FRISON-ROCHE, supra note 11; Mark Thatcher, The Third Force? Independent Regulatory
Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe, 18 GOVERNANCE 347 (2005).
58. A substantially different status in France. Civil service employees enjoy special protections
against dismissal and-for the higher echelons at least-considerable status. Barry Owen, France, in
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 50, 56, 69 (J.A. Chandler ed., 2000). Independent contractors
do not enjoy the same protections or status (though an outsider interacting with the agency may not
know the status of different employees).
59. The Grands Ecoles are part of the French system of higher education; unlike public universities,
entry to them is governed by competitive examinations that students sit for after extensive preparatory
courses. While it is not clear which schools are included in this category, most of the high ranking civil
servants are recruited from these schools. Some of the most prestigious include l'Ecole Nationale
d'Administration and l'f-cole Polytechnique.
The Grands Corps are the organizations of senior members of the civil service. Examples of such corps
include the Council of State, the Court of Accounts, the Finance Inspectorate, the Diplomatic Corps
and the Prefectoral Corps, the Corps of Mining Engineering and the Corps of Roads and Bridges. An
official's primary focus of identification and loyalty is to her corps, rather than to the civil service as a
whole. Each corps has a different functional role, but they may be called upon to do other jobs, since
their quality is highly valued and they are in high demand. Members can take leave and go into poli-
tics, retaining their membership and a right to return. Owen, supra note 58, at 50.
60. The Commission de Rdgulation de l'Energie.
61. Interview with members of CRE, in Paris, France (Jan. 10, 2005); interview with a former mem-
ber of CRE, in France (Jan. 26, 2005) (a more accurate location is omitted to preserve interviewee's
anonymity); interview with a member of RTE (the independent electricity network operator, a subsidy
of EDF), in Paris, France (Jan. 11, 2005).
62. The Autorit6 de R6gulation de T616communications.
63. Interview with members of ART, in Paris, France (Dec. 8, 2004); interview with a member of
AFORS, in Paris, France (Jan. 31, 2005).
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gles, the agencies used participation mechanisms to create legitimacy that streng-
thened their position. Indeed, by associating more organizations, institutions and
interest groups with the decision-making process, CRE is reducing the remains of
state department's "tutelage"-or political mastery--over its activities.
The rest of this paper discusses the participation mechanisms used by the six
regulatory agencies, contrasting them with common practice in the United
States. 64 Most of the mechanisms described here have either been adopted by the
European agencies on their own initiative or, if they were imposed on the agen-
cies, the agencies went far beyond the legal requirements. With one exception:
external consumer watchdogs (i.e., agencies whose job it is to monitor the sector
on behalf of consumers) were usually created by legislatures.
III. THE STRATEGIES THAT WOULD NOT TRAVEL, METHODS REJECTED
Before discussing mechanisms that parallel what is used in the United States
to provide for citizen participation, this section will address two rules justified in
the United States as providing for meaningful participation or preventing an un-
dermining of participation that were rejected by the agencies researched. These
are open meetings and rules prohibiting ex parte communication.
Rules forbidding ex parte communication are part of the federal practice of
administrative law, certainly in formal adjudications, 65 but possibly also in rule-
making, at least according to one opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit.66 They have been included in statutes governing specific agencies
67
and adopted by agencies through their own rules. They exist in most states to
some degree. 68 In at least some situations they have even been anchored in the
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 69  These rules
mandate that after a certain stage in the decision-making process, an agency will
not meet separately with any of the parties involved, that meetings are limited to
public hearings or written communications open to the other side, and that any
meetings that do occur will be recorded.
The other relevant laws require decision-making meetings inside agencies to
be held in public. These are codified in laws on the federal level, such as the
64. Comparison to the United States is always problematic. Even more than other countries, the
United States is large and complex, and its decentralization means that any claim will probably not
apply somewhere. The discussion below of methods not used in the United States, used in the United
States, and beyond the typical in the United States, applies to the "average" or common decision-
making process in the United States, to the best of my knowledge. There are bound to be one or two
counterexamples, but the general picture is as described below.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d).
66. Home Box Office v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
67. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57a (placing ex parte communication limitations on the FTC).
68. See Suzanne J. Piotrowski & Erin L. Borry, Open Public Meetings in New Jersey: History and
Current Issues, 3 OPEN GOv'T 1 (April 2007), available at http://www.opengovjoumal.org/article/
view/616/790.
69. Sangamon Valley Television Corp v. U.S., 269 F.2d 221, 222-224 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (commonly
interpreted to be based on an interpretation of the due process clause); see Richard J. Pierce, Reply:
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Government in the Sunshine Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act.70
They are included in state laws in most state statutes.7'
The relevant justification for such rules is that meetings with one party alone
or meetings away from the public eye could negate the public participation
process. If agency officials can meet parties separately, without public knowledge
of the content of such meetings, they may base decisions on secret arguments and
reasons raised in such meetings, including illegitimate arguments and undue influ-
ences. That is the concern raised by those worried about agency capture by indus-
try or other groups. Such meetings also reduce the accountability of agen-
cies-because if it would be impossible to know what their decisions are actually
based on, how could the stakeholders or the public prevent abuses of discretion or
decisions based on illegitimate considerations?
However, as mentioned above, these arguments have been rejected by the Eu-
ropean agencies studied here. In fact, these agencies take the opposite approach
and emphasize both their willingness to meet with any actor at any stage of the
process and the high number of bilateral (meaning here between the agency and
one party) meetings they hold.72
To explain their reluctance to follow the ex parte rules that apply in the Unit-
ed States, the six agencies discussed in this article both emphasize the critical role
of bilateral meetings and express disagreements with the concerns raised about
them. 73 First, these agencies see bilateral meetings as critical to their job in more
than one way. That meetings with stakeholders provide invaluable information is
uncontroversial, but these agencies add that they receive more candid and more
accurate information in bilateral meetings, when the stakeholders do not need to
worry about the impression their words will make or the ability of adversaries to
use their words against them (accepting as legitimate the unwillingness of stake-
holders to say certain things in the presence of rivals).74 Such meetings are also
appropriate forums to achieve compromises, which is exactly the concern raised
by opponents--that "secret deals" will be struck. In addition, these agencies see
the meetings as critical in another way.75 The regulators cannot draw their legiti-
70. Kathy Bradley, Do You Feel the Sunshine? Government in the Sunshine Act: Its Objectives,
Goals, and Effect on the FCC and You, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 473,476 (1997); Suzanne J. Piotrowski &
Erin L. Borry, Transparency and Local Government Websites, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL E-GOVERNMENT ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION: COMPARATIVE STUDIES
390, 392 (Christopher G. Reddick ed., 2009).
71. Piotrowski & Borry, supra note 68, at 4; Piotrowski & Bony, supra note 70, at 400-04.
72. Interviews with members of the Swedish Telecomunications Agency, PTS, in Stockholm, Swe-
den (Sept. 7, 15, 23; and Oct. 7, 15, 2004); interviews with members of STEM, in Eskiltuna, Sweden
(Sept. 8, 23, 27, 2004), in Stockholm, Sweden (Oct. 6, 2004); interview with members of ART, in
Paris, France (Dec. 8 2004); interviews with members of CRE, in Paris, France (Dec. 16, 2004 and Jan.
10, 2005); interview with members of Ofgem, in London, England (Oct. 20, Dec. 1, 2004). A similar
finding in relation to Oftel was found by Hall, Hood and Scott in their in depth study of that agency,
see HALL, ET AL., supra note 11.
73. Interviews with members of the Swedish Telecomunications Agency, PTS, in Stockholm, Swe-
den (Sept. 7, 15, 23; and Oct. 7, 2004); interviews with members of STEM, in Eskiltuna (Sept. 8, 23,
27, 2004), in Stockholm, Sweden (Oct. 6, 2004); interviews with members of ART, in Paris, France
(Dec. 8, 2004); interviews with members of CRE, in Paris, France (Dec. 16, 2004 and Jan. 10, 2005);
Interview with members of Ofgem, in London, England (Oct. 20 and Dec. 1, 2004); interview with
members of Ofcom (previously Oftel), in London, England (Oct. 26, 2004).
74. See supra, sources cited note 73.
75. See supra, sources cited note 73.
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macy from elections, being that they are unelected; meeting with the parties can
serve as an alternative source of legitimacy by showing openness and willingness
to listen to the public. 76 In essence, the regulator in these circumstances is claim-
ing, "While not elected, I am responsive to a variety of actors, willing to listen and
address their concerns, and therefore legitimate."
Naturally, some stakeholders claim that secret deals and behind-the-scenes
dealings were held between an agency and other actors. For example, both in
France and the United Kingdom, concerns were raised about the illegitimate influ-
ences of politicians. 77 In both countries, concerns were also expressed about deals
made between the agency and the respective industry.78
However, agency members respond to such claims in two ways. First, they
emphasize the desirability of discussion and consultation, even in face of such
fears. Second, they say, it comes down to trust.79 If agency members want to
strike a deal with an actor, they can find an opportunity to do so-for example, in
the United States, one result of ex parte rules was to make the early stages in the
process, before such restrictions apply, more important. 80 If they seek to base
their decisions on illegitimate considerations, ex parte and open meetings rules
will not prevent considering such issues. And they come with too high a price in
terms of information lost.
IV. PARALLELS TO THE UNITED STATES
A. Consultations
The first parallel between the six agencies and the United States is actually
not a mechanism of new governance, but of old government. Several scholars
have commented on the increase in participation mechanisms adopted in the Unit-
ed States in relation to rulemaking during the 1970s and 1980s.81 Increased par-
ticipation requirements were established both by Congress and by the federal
courts.82 As a result, today's rulemaking process includes both the opportunity for
parties to comment on proposed rules and an agency's duty to address issues
raised in those comments." These mechanisms are criticized for not allowing
enough meaningful participation but are seen as an important minimum require-
76. See supra, sources cited note 73.
77. Interview with a member of AFORS, in Paris, France (Jan. 31, 2005); interview with members
of the British energy industry (company names omitted to preserve confidentiality), in London, Eng-
land (Nov. 8, 30, 2004).
78. Interview with a member of UFC-Que Choisir, French consumer organization, in Paris, France
(Dec. 21, 2004); interview with members of PUAF (the Public Utility Access Forum), in London,
England (Nov. 15, 2004); interview with a member of PUAF, in Bristol, England (Nov. 24, 2004);
interview with members of the National Consumer Council, in London, England (Nov. 16, 2004).
79. Interview with members of PTS, in Stockholm, Sweden (Sept. 7, 15, 23; and Oct. 15, 2004);
interview with members of STEM, in Eskiltuna, Sweden (Sept. 8, 2004).
80. See generally CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE
LAW AND MAKE POLICY (3d ed. 2003).
81. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1669, 1670 (1975); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATION (1988).
82. SHAPIRO, supra note 81, at 45-46.
83. Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking, supra note 4, at 946.
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ment to at least allow some public input. 84 It is also still the most common mode
of participation: new governance mechanisms are adopted occasionally, but most
rules have a comment period.85
The European parallel to this process, increasingly adopted by the agencies
studied and now also included in the E.U. directives, 86 are consultations. Before
an important policy decision, the agencies discussed here publish a draft decision
on the Internet and provide an email and mailing address for comments. The final
decision is made after consideration of those comments.
87
Given the importance of consultations in Europe and of the notice and com-
ment parallel in the United States, this section will detail the consultation process
in the three countries studied. The general format is described above. But while
the basic process is similar, the form and inclusiveness of the consultations vary
across countries.
1. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom adopted a consultation process in the relatively early
years of liberalizations, and the agencies are extensive users of consultations. For
those familiar with the "Yes, Minister"88 culture and its hostility to open govern-
ment and its elitist ethos, it may be surprising to hear British regulators discuss
consultations in these terms:
The essence of regulation is consultation and transparency ....89
You are likely to get much better decisions. And it is a virtually novel
idea for government that you expose everything in advance, rather than
just say, we have decided to do X, but I mean it's actually easier in a
non-ministerial body. That's ...the purpose of [what] consultation is
for; you take [sic] better decisions if you have exposed your developing
thinking at various stages to everybody's reaction.
90
However, today, consultation is the agencies' modus operandi. In electricity,
it was partly a response to criticism for lack of transparency;9 1 in telecommunica-
tions it was self-imposed by the regulator.92 The British consultations are based
84. Id.
85. There are some exceptions to the APA comment requirements, though they are beyond the scope
of this article.
86. Council and Parliament Directive 2002/21 § 15, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33-50 (providing a common
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services); Council and Parliament
Directive 2005/89, art. 4, 2006 O.J. (L 033) 22-27 (concerning measures to safeguard security of
electricity supply and infrastructure investment).
87. British agencies also create a "Regulatory Impact Analysis," paralleling the OMB review
process. However, that discussion goes beyond the issue of participation.
88. See generally JONATHAN LYNN & ANTONY JAY, THE COMPLETE YES MINISTER: THE DIARIES
OF A CABINET MINISTER BY THE RIGHT HON. JAMES HACKER MP (1989).
89. Interview with members of Ofcom (previously Oftel), in London, England (Oct. 26, 2004).
90. Interview with members of Ofgem, in London, England (Oct. 20, 2004).
91. See PROSSER, LAW AND THE REGULATORS, supra note 11.
92. See HALL, et al., supra note 11.
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on open participation and have a wide range of stakeholders regularly participat-
ing.93 They routinely receive submissions from industry, consumer organizations,
individual consumers, academics, local governments, and other interested parties.
The British agencies routinely hold oral hearings in addition to written consulta-
tions and allow extensive expression by anyone who wants to attend. Additional-
ly, they usually hold more than one round of consultations, and they respond to
comments extensively in subsequent drafts and in final decision documents. 94 The
agencies hold frequent meetings with any interested party to discuss the issues
included in the consultations. The regulators have substantial experience at this
process and are constantly involved in a dialogue with stakeholders.95
If anything, the criticism heard in Britain is that agencies hold too many con-
sultations that are too long and too detailed, which is a concern voiced by several
interviewees:
I think our regulator has really gone a bit over the top. Their consultation
papers are huge. They are very, very long, very detailed; they come out
about twice a day, you know, there's a constant stream of them, and...
small companies can't, even big companies, they have a regulatory man-
ager who spends all his time going through consultations, responding to
consultations.
96
A member of Ofcom noted, "Ofcom has had an awful lot of consultations.
When it started, it was criticized for having twenty consultations at a time, to
which they replied, 'We believe we're obliged to have most of them. The reviews
require consultations. "
97
Even a consumer representative who thought consultation was a good thing
pointed out that, "I don't feel that the consumer world as a whole is adequately
resourced to cope with it."
98
This places the agency in an unwinnable situation. However, most actors
agreed that it is better to have too many consultations than too few. The best
phrasing came from a member of the Department of Trade and Industry:
Can't win, can you? Ofcom [has] taken [the] view that they will always
consult before they regulate, and I think that is a good principle because
otherwise how can you judge that it's proportionate? And regulation de-
termines if [a] business plan is viable or not, and if you don't give people
93. Rubinstein, supra note 30, at ch.4, 148-49.
94. A fact which was cited by more than one French interviewee as a practice that should be adopted
by French agencies. Interview with a member of Orange, France, in Paris, France (Jan. 28, 2005);
interview with members of a telecommunications operator, in Paris, France (Jan. 24, 2005); interview
with a member of AFORS, in Paris, France (Jan. 31, 2005).
95. HALL ET AL., supra note 11, at 47-48; Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Administrative Agencies as Crea-
tors of Administrative Law Norms: Evidence from the U.K., France and Sweden, in COMPARATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth, eds.) (forthcoming 2010).
96. Interview with a members of the Department of Trade and Industry working on energy issues, in
London, England (Nov. 3, 2004).
97. Interview with members of Ofcom (previously Oftel), in London, England (Oct. 26, 2004).
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in business an opportunity to comment, you can inadvertently cause a lot
of damage .... [N]othing forces people to respond to consultation. It
does take a bit longer, but by ten-to-one it's better to consult than not.
99
2. Sweden
Swedish consultations are very different than British ones. Sweden has a
long tradition of consultation and decision-making by consensus.1°° Consultation
was an inbuilt part of decision-making by the agencies from the start. In Sweden
the decision went through at least two rounds of in-depth consultation with a
number of important actors, with each actor reading the proposals carefully and
commenting in detail, and the subsequent rounds including everyone's comments.
This process is still used by the regulators and also within government to-
wards different actors on different levels. Essentially, the process ensures agency
proposals are thoroughly reviewed. On the one hand, this consultation process
includes a very specific set of actors. The materials are distributed to government
actors, such as the ministry, the competition agency and the consumer agency;
they are provided to the workers' unions, the employers' unions, and to industry.
While this range of actors is pretty broad (the workers' union, for example, has a
membership of about 2 million workers, a relatively high percentage of people in
a country of 9 million people), lOl it does not provide a channel for individual con-
sumers or consumer organizations to comment.
On the other hand, these actors are not barred from the process. Since Swe-
den has extensive open government laws, interested parties can get access to the
consultation documents, and the Swedish National Post and Telecom agency
(PTS) 10 2 has been, in recent years, posting its consultations on the Web site in the
belief that it will help reduce litigation. 10 3 In addition, the relatively limited inclu-
siveness of the process also stems from the high level of trust these agencies en-
joy. Constantly, all actors expressed their respect for the agencies, which are seen
as competent, honest and well intentioned (though many of the actors disagree
with some of their substantive decisions). 104 Under these circumstances, there are
no pressures on the agency to add more actors to its consultations.
99. Interview with a member of the Department of Trade and Industry specializing in energy issues,
in London, England (Oct. 20, 2004).
100. See HECLO & MADSEN, supra note 47, at 9-12; YATES, supra note 47 at 154-55.
101. LO SWEDEN, THE SWEDISH TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION 5, available at
http:llwww.lo.selhome/lo/home.nsf/unidView/2C54A4FCCAA32884C I256E750051 BE88/$file/egpre
sentation2004.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2009). Union membership in 2002 was 1,918,800. Rate of
unionization in 2002 was at eighty-three percent. Id. at 6.
102. Post-och Telestyrelsen, the Swedish National Post and Telecom Agency.
103. Interviews with members of PTS, in Stockholm, Sweden (Sept. 7, 2004). PTS faces a very high
volume of cases brought against it by operators.
104. Interview with a member of Svenskenergi, the Swedish Energy Industry association, in Stock-
holm, Sweden (Sept. 16, 2004); interview with members of the Swedish Consumer Agency, in Stock-
holm, Sweden (Sept. 22, 2004).
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3. France
As explained above, at the start of the process, the decision-making in France
was done by a triumvirate of actors: the agency, the government, and the national
champion (the incumbent national company). However, as time went by, the
agencies started to use more and more consultations, partly because of E.U. direc-
tives, partly to establish their independence from government and incumbents, and
partly to create legitimacy.
By 2004, French consultations were frequent and extensive. They are mainly
published online, though the agencies also meet with any interested actors to dis-
cuss issues. The agency emphasizes that its behavior is legitimate by referring to
its extensive consultations and the opportunity to respond. As explained by one
agency member, "Since our work is completely transparent, because we conduct
public consultations on everything, actors have an opportunity to express their
views."
105
The main participants in the consultations are, however, industry members,
rather than consumer organizations. Consumer organizations, as opposed to
workers' unions, are, according to the interviews conducted for this project, very
weak in France and unrepresentative.' 06 For example, in telecommunications, one
of the leading consumer organizations, UFC Que-Choisir, had a staff devoted to
telecommunications that consisted of one member. On the other hand, that mem-
ber was very active and well known to agency members, expressing his views on
many issues and filing suit against the agency on at least one issue, mobile phone
termination prices. 07
In addition, some industry members expressed a desire to see more discussion
of their comments and response to those comments by agency. The agencies, they
said, were inconsistent; they sometimes responded to comments and sometimes
did not. The stakeholders wanted clear indications that their input was read and
considered, even if it was eventually rejected. 108
For all of the agencies, however, consultations have become an important part
of their operations.
B. Consumer Agencies and Ombudsmen
Like the United States, each country studied attempted to create a customer-
representation and customer-support apparatus to assure consumer interests are
represented. In the United States, there is the National Ombudsman in the Small
Business Administration, for example, devoted to helping small businesses handle
105. Interview with members of ART, in Paris, France, (Dec. 17, 2004 (My translation from
"(Comme) notre travail est tout a fait transparent, parce que tous ce qu'on fait on fait des consultations
publique, il y a occasion de se exprimer.").
106. Or at least, their presence in these fields is very weak. Interview with members of ART, in Paris,
France (Dec. 8, 2004); interviews with members of CRE, in Paris, France (Dec. 16, 2004 and Jan. 10,
2005). The causal connection-are they weak because they are unrepresentative or unrepresentative
because they are weak?--is unclear.
107. Interview with members of ART, in Paris, France, (Dec. 9, 2004).
108. Interview with a member of Orange, France, in Paris, France (Jan. 28, 2005); interview with a
member of AFORS, in Paris, France (Jan. 31, 2005); interview with a member of Telecomltalia
France, in Paris, France (Jan. 27, 2005).
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excessive regulation."° Similarly, in 1998 Congress passed the IRS Restructuring
and Reform Act, in which it created the office of the National Taxpayer Advocate,
which is independent from the Internal Revenue Service.' 10 The Consumer Prod-
ucts Safety Commission was created with a similar goal."' Similarly, the coun-
tries studied had their own more or less independent bodies to represent consumer
interests.
1. Consumer Agencies
One form that this mechanism takes in the three countries examined is to
create specialized agencies whose job definition is to represent consumer agen-
cies-like the Consumer Protection Agency in the United States (though one of
those described here is a sector-specific agency). Two such agencies deserve
special attention: the Swedish Consumer Agency and Energywatch, the British
agency created to represent consumers' interests in the energy sector.
Sweden generally believes in one mandating law per agency, so to protect
consumers it created a special agency with its own law." 2 In Sweden, in addition
to the sector regulators, there has always been a consumer agen-
cy-konsumentverket--to represent consumer interest.' 3  This agency gets to
comment on any policy changes at the draft stage. 14 Any major policy change or
decision receives its input."' It also initiates action and policy changes on issues
that consumers complain about, mostly based on reports from the municipal advi-
sors discussed below. 16 The agency also can create help mechanisms for con-
sumers; for example, the consumer agency created price comparison software that
allows consumers to compare prices between different electricity and telecommu-
nications companies. 
1 7
Similarly, Energywatch was created in the 2000 Utilities Bill to address con-
sumer issues in the English energy industry. Like the Swedish agency, Energy-
watch handles consumer complaints and can raise problematic issues with the
regulators. It also publishes reports and initiates campaigns of its own. For ex-
109. U.S. Small Business Admin., About the Office of the National Ombudsman,
http://www.sba.gov/aboutsbalsbaprograms/ombudsman/aboutus/OMBUDABOUTUS.html (last
visited Oct. 24, 2009).
110. 26 U.S.C § 7811 (2006).
111. See U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, CPSC Overview, http://www.cpsc.gov/
about/about.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
112. Rubinstein, supra note 30, at 120.
113. Id. at 120, 125-126.
114. Id. at 125.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 135-136.
117. See Konsumentverket, Consumer Advice, http://www.konsumentverket.se/otherlanguages/
English/Personal-advice/Consumer-advice/ (last visited November 27, 2009) (for useful information
for consumers); Konsumentemas Tele, TV, & lnternetbrya, http://www.ktib.se/ (last visited Nov. 27,
2009)(for information provided by the industry). The comparison engine for telecommunications
prices can be found at Telepriskollen, http://www.telepriskollen.se/Oversikt.aspx (last visited Apr. 1,
2009). For electricity prices, visit Min Ber5kning, http://www.energimarknadsinspektionen.se/
elpriskollen/min-berakning (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
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ample, Energywatch forced the regulator to defend its positions on prepaid meters,
and to work on debt relief and mis-selling.
118
These agencies are not a mouthpiece for government or another regulator.
They take their role as consumer representatives very seriously and have, on more
than one occasion, clashed with the regulator when they do not see it as sufficient-
ly protective of consumer interests. 1 9 They tend to have different priorities than
the regulator, and there is quite a bit of tension between the consumer protection
agencies and the regulators.'
20
2. Consumer Assistance
Created for similar purposes, though mostly initiated by the regulator, con-
sumer assistance programs are bodies aimed at helping consumers by means of
advice or mediation. In the Swedish electricity industry, the regulator decided
(with the consent of industry), after facing many complaints about customers have
trouble switching their retail supplier, to create an advisory body. The Electricity
Advice Bureau is financed by industry, but its board, which includes representa-
tives from industry, the regulator and the consumer agency, has a majority of gov-
ernment representatives. The board gives advice to consumers and can also help
mediate between them and the companies.121
Similarly, Britain has a telecommunications ombudsman to handle com-
plaints. The British service is mainly an arbitration service, which, interestingly,
is mandatory for the member companies but not for consumers.
122
3. Stakeholders Groups: Working with Industry and Consumers
At the heart of the governance movement, it seems, are participatory mechan-
isms that involve joint decision-making between stakeholders and the govern-
ment. 123 The United States has been experimenting with regulatory negotiation,
118. Rubinstein, supra note 30, at 225-226, 274-279.
119. Id.
120. Interview with members of Ofgem, in London, England (Oct. 20, 2004); interview with mem-
bers of Energywatch (the British government's energy sector watchdog), in London, England (Oct. 27,
2004); interview with members of STEM, in Stockholm, Sweden (Oct. 6, 2004); interviews with
members of the Swedish Telecomunications Agency, PTS, in Stockholm, Sweden (Sept. 7, 15, 23; and
Oct. 7, 2004); interviews with members of the Swedish Consumer Agency, in Stockholm, Sweden
(Sept. 22, 2004).
121. See Swedish Consumer Electricity Advice Bureau, Summary in English,
http://www.elradgivningsbyran.se/artikelarticle.asp?-tp-article-id=109&avd=ARTOOS (last visited
Nov. 11, 2009).
122. See ADRnow.org.uk, Office of Telecommunications Ombudsman,
http://www.admow.org.uk/go/SubPage-67.html. (last visited Nov. 27, 2009).
123. See HIRST, supra note 4; JOHN CAMPBELL, ET AL., GOVERNANCE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
(1991); STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM D. EGGERS, GOVERNING BY NETWORK: THE NEW SHAPE OF
THE PUBLIC SECTOR (2004); DAVID M. TRUBEK & LOUISE G. TRUBEK, THE COEXISTENCE OF NEW
GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL REGULATION: COMPLEMENTARY OR RIVALRY (2005); Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Jody Freeman, The
Private Role in the Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Martha Minow, Public and
Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003); Marc
Schneiberg, Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by Association: Private Order and
Private Controls in American Fire Insurance, 27 POL. & SOC'Y 67 (1999).
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deliberative juries, advisory committees, and other forms of joint decision-
making.124 This form of decision-making has been adopted in the three countries
discussed to help deal with consumer problems. In Britain, stakeholder groups are
used in issues related to debt relief, aide to low-income consumers, disconnec-
tions, and competition problems. 25 In France, they were used to address competi-
tion problems. 126 In Sweden, they were used to address the setting of distribution
prices. 127 Several notable examples are described below.
In 2002, the Swedish electricity regulator, General Hhkan Heden, decided to
change the way the agency reviewed electricity distribution prices. Instead of
examining a company's accounting books to see if the prices it charged were rea-
sonable in relation to the costs, or instituting a cap on prices-both methods tried
by the previous regulator-Heden decided to create a computer model that as-
sesses what a utility should be charging given its performance. The regulator then
compares the projected prices with the actual prices. 28
To develop the model, Heden set up a collaborative effort between members
of his small regulatory agency and engineers from the electricity distribution
firms. 129 Together, they developed the aspects to be considered and created the
software platform later put in use. 13 Unfortunately, after the results of test runs of
the model became public, industry changed its view of it and became hostile. The
model became a source of contention-a concern for those who see increased
participation by private actors as a way to defuse future conflicts. 131
Similarly, when in response to complaints and negative media coverage the
regulator initiated an "electricity advice bureau," the industry association Swede-
nergy (Sevenk Energi) agreed to finance it. The board running the bureau was
composed of members of the regulator, the consumer agency and industry (with
government having a majority). 32
However, the story that stands out the most is that of electricity in France;
important to the background of that story were the switching problems regulators
in the United Kingdom and Sweden faced. When electricity was liberalized, the
regulators in Sweden and the United Kingdom found themselves facing substan-
tial problems from unsavory competition practices by both established incum-
bents, who did not want to let customers go, and new entrants, who were despe-
rate to grab new customers. The problems included resistance from established
124. See Coglianese, Citizen Participation, supra note 4; KERWIN, supra note 80; Stephen M. John-
son, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participation and Access to Govern-
mental Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 391 (1998).
125. Rubinstein, supra note 30, at 226.
126. Id. at 279.
127. Id. at 182-183.
128. Interview with members of STEM, in Eskiltuna, Sweden (Sept. 8 2004), in Stockholm, Sweden
(Oct. 6, 2004).
129. Id.
130. Interview with members of STEM, in Eskiltuna, Sweden (Sept. 8, 2004), in Stockholm, Sweden
(Oct. 6, 2004); interview with a member of the Electricity Advice Bureau in Stockholm, Sweden (Oct.
4, 2004).
131. Interview with members of STEM, in Eskiltuna, Sweden (Sept. 8, 2004), in Stockholm, Sweden
(Oct. 6, 2004).
132. Interview with members of STEM, in Eskiltuna, Sweden (Sept. 8, 2004); interview with a mem-
ber of Svenskenergi, the Swedish Energy Industry association, in Stockholm, Sweden (Sept. 16, 2004);
interview with members of the Swedish Consumer Agency, in Stockholm, Sweden (Sept. 22, 2004).
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companies who refused to comply with requirements that would enable customers
to switch providers or sabotaged the customers' ability to do so (for example, in
Sweden, company employees refused to give customers their meter number-a
necessary piece of data in order to switch suppliers-although they were legally
required to do so). Other problems were abusive practices by salespeople who
filled in switching forms for customers who refused to switch, whether face-to-
face or on the phone. This also included salespeople who threatened customers
who lied to them. In an extreme example in Britain, two salespersons for the Brit-
ish subsidiary of EDF went into the local library, opened the voters' register and
filled switching forms for all the people in the register. That trick led the regulator
to impose a £2 million fine on the company, which made it sit up and pay atten-
tion. "3
In hindsight, some may claim the problems could have been anticipated, but
the agencies did not have the benefit of prior experience, and in spite of the tech-
nical and economic expertise of the members, the agencies did not anticipate
them.13" The problems led customers to mistrust the electricity companies and
often just shy away from the process of switching suppliers and also to problems
of legitimacy for the whole liberalization experience.
However, in France, as explained above, the regulators have an email list and
meet regularly to compare notes. They know what is going on in the other coun-
tries and where the problems are. So when France was forced to open its electrici-
ty market to competition (because of a E.U. deadline and waiting till the last mo-
ment to comply with it), the French were aware of the problems and prepared for
them-demonstrating the advantage of being the latecomer. To prepare for these
kinds of problems, the French created a work group that included consumer repre-
sentatives of both residential and industry consumers, industry representatives
from the various parts of the electricity sector, and public bodies' representa-
tives. 135 The goal of the group was to put in place measures to protect consum-
ers. 136 Its powers included assuring that relevant information was available to
consumers and creating methods for handling complaints.137 The group included
several topical committees and a general board. 138 It was so successful that CRE
not only kept it operating but extended its responsibilities to include, for example
133. See Rubinstein, supra note 30, at ch.6 (elaborating on liberalization in Sweden and the United
Kingdom and noting additional references).
134. And that kind of Monday-morning quarterbacking is inherently unfair.
135. Groupe de Travail Electricit6 2007, http://www.gte2007.com/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2009); Inter-
view with members of CRE, Paris, France (Jan. 26, 2005).
136. Groupe de Travail Electricit6 2007, supra note 135 ("Les directives europ6ennes du 26 juin 2003
prrvoient que tous les consommateurs d'61ectricit6 et de gaz pourront choisir librement leur fournis-
seur A partir du I er juillet 2007. A cette date, les mesures relatives A la protection des consommateurs.
. . devront 6galement avoir 6t6 mises en place. Pour se preparer A cette 6chrance, la Commission de
regulation de l'dnergie (CRE) a mis en place des instances de concertation entre les diffrents acteurs
concerns, drnomm6es 'Groupe de Travail Electricit6 2007'... " I have translated this to: "The Euro-
pean Directives of June 26, 2003 require that all consumers or gas and electricity have the freedom to
choose their supplier from July 1, 2007. At that date, the measures related to protecting consumers
need to be in place. To prepare for that event, CRE put in place spaces for consultation between the
different concerned actors. Those spaces are named 'Work group in electricity 2007'......
137. Id.
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the creation and monitoring of rules for provision of information by the distribu-
tion networks.
This group model is somewhat different from the "reg-neg" model used in the
United States 139 in several ways. First, unlike reg-neg, the agency does not have
to consult on or publish the composition of the group (though if the goal is to get
representation, it has an interest in finding good representatives). Second, and
more importantly, the group's end result is not just the start of a process of making
policy; subject to agency's approval, the group's decisions are the final rule.' 40
And from my perusal, the agency regularly approves the product.
The British agencies also initiated workgroups that included agency members
and industry representatives in order to write industry-wide codes regulating sell-
ing practices. 141 However, these groups are different from those workgroups used
by the French communication agency in terms of the level of impact. The prod-
ucts created by the French telecommunications groups do not enjoy the same kind
of general acceptance; they may well be rejected. The groups' recommendations
are sometimes considered and sometimes not. To give two examples, in relation
to local loop unbundling, 142 the consensus of all actors in the group was to impose
sanctions if France T616com acts in a problematic manner. Unsurprisingly, France
T616com's offer for local loop unbundling did not include a sanction mechanism.
The agency, which has the authority to approve or reject France T616com's pro-
posal, did not insist on including such a mechanism. In contrast, in relation to
including local calls in the preselection program, the format under which calls
were included was determined by the input from alternative operators that ART,
the telecommunications regulator, accepted."'
4. Consumer Panels
Another mechanism used in the United States that has been adopted by the
British telecommunications regulator is consumer advisory panels. Ofcom in
particular has been consulting with consumer panels. Ofcom even created a
stronger and better-protected panel as part of its reorganization.144 There are sev-
eral indications that it has been taking their advice very seriously. To give one
example: when considering the mechanisms through which low income custom-
ers are helped to finance telecommunications services, the consumer panel's sup-
port of including an option to make outgoing calls in the low-cost incoming calls
139. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rule-
making, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Nego-
tiation and the Public Interest--EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987); Philip J. Hater,
Assessing the Assessors: the Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32
(2000).
140. Group de Travail Electricit6, supra note 135.
141. Rubinstein, supra note 30 at 276-279. British agencies also created workgroups to deal with
disconnection issues. See id. at 209, 226.
142. Local loop unbundling is one way the European telecommunications regulators attempted to
increase competition. It requires incumbent telecommunications company to allow competitors access
to the copper wires going into people homes--the local loop--which those companies initially put in
place, i.e., it requires them to lease out their equipment up to the circuit in peoples' homes.
143. Interview with a member of Orange, France, in Paris, France (Jan. 28, 2005).
144. See Communications Consumer Panel, Home, http://www.ofcomconsumerpanel.org.uk/ (last
visited October 27, 2009).
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service that British Telecoms (BT) was about to offer led BT to allow collect calls
as part of the plan, and its input led Oftel to simplify some of its documents.1
45
V. BEYOND THE UNITED STATES
This last section addresses several mechanisms that do not have parallels in
the United States.
146
A. Using Electronic Communications
147
Technology has been used by both American and European agencies to im-
prove the interface between citizens and government for at least a decade. Most
administrative agencies in both continents have Web sites today, usually with a
large amount of information available on it.148 In the United States, the Web site
regulations.gov allows interested citizens to comment on proposed regulations,
149
though there are conflicting views on the effectiveness of e-rulemaking. 150 One of
the first innovations was the French telecommunications regulator's use of elec-
tronic communications not just to provide information, but also to create a dialo-
gue with citizens.
The staff of the French regulator, ART (today ARCEP, with the addition of
electronic communications and posts), includes a high number of talented tele-
communications engineers, graduates of the Lcole Nationale Supdrieure des
145. Dorit Reiss, Agency Accountability Strategies After Liberalization: Universal Service in the
United Kingdom, France, and Sweden, 31 L. & POL'Y 111 (2009).
146. There is a clear problem here: the United States is a very big country, it is decentralized and the
fragmented nature of its government encourages local variety and possible experimentation. For exam-
ple, after presenting this topic at the Collaborative Governance conference at the University of Califor-
nia--Hastings and discussing the Swedish municipal advisors described below, a member of the au-
dience approached me and mentioned that the municipality in which she worked more than 15 years
ago had, for a period, a position of a municipal advisor. The municipality was in a transition period and
used the advisor to help citizens navigate the government process in this confusing time. In other
words, chances are that the examples described below exist somewhere in the United States in some
form. However, they are clearly not the modus operandi; they are not very common.
147. Any government mechanism that attempts to increase participation using electronic communica-
tions raises concerns about the distributive effects. The concern is that vulnerable citizens, those on
low income, the disabled, or foreign citizens, will not be able to use those mechanisms. While address-
ing those concerns is beyond the scope of this paper, at least two points can be raised in response. First,
participation should, as a pragmatic matter, be treated relatively. Even those supporting an extremely
strong form of government participation may support an increase that does not quite achieve that goal.
Using electronic communications allows citizens that have access to the Internet participate in ways
that before would require a much greater commitment of time and resources, for example, traveling to
the government center. Second, at least in many United States or European countries, free access to
electronic communications is usually available through public libraries. Indeed, when this author as a
graduate student was traveling through Europe, I used the Internet in public libraries extensively to
work on my research. Therefore, the range of people with access to those communications is not nec-
essarily limited to the wealthy.
148. Though the ease of use and the quality of information can vary substantially between agencies.
149. Regulations.gov-Your Voice in Federal Decision-Making, http://www.regulations.gov (last
visited October 27, 2009).
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T616communications. 15 1 These engineers are easily conversant with the newest
technologies and enjoy using them.' 52 It is therefore not surprising that the regula-
tor they are part of has been using several interactive electronic communications
techniques to communicate with citizens and exchange information.
Two methods in particular stand out. The first is the use of a blog.' 53 One of
the concerns facing the agency is the relationship between the central government
and local authorities. Tense relationships between the government in Paris and
the other parts of France have long been a reality of French administrative cul-
ture.1 54 To improve relationships and reduce tensions on this issue, the French
telecommunications regulator created a blog on the topic, the "BLOG de 1'6quipe
Collectivit6s."' 155 The goals of the blog are both to provide information and to
enable interested citizens to provide comments, raise concerns and ask questions.
Accordingly, it appeals both to the goal of increasing transparency and the goals
of enhancing the agency's legitimacy and increasing trust between the agency and
the citizens. Naturally, such a blog requires constant maintenance, and unless
there is at least one agency member committed to it, it is hard to keep it going in
the long term. Nonetheless, it suggests an interesting avenue for exchanging
thoughts between citizens and government, which may become more and more
relevant as today's new adults-nicknamed "Generation Y"-start using those
mechanisms.
The other mechanism ARCEP utilizes that suggests interesting possibilities is
the use of online chats to answer citizens' questions and concerns. 156  ARCEP
organizes periodic chats on issues they think citizens would be interested in. They
publish the subject and time of the chat in advance, and a staff member is availa-
ble to answer questions. The format looks exactly like any online chat room, with
participants able to see each others' questions and comments, except that it is also
possible to see comments posted online before joining the chat. To give one ex-
ample, on July 7, 2007, ARCEP held a chat on the topic of universal service,' 5 7 in
151. See Owen, supra note 58 (for a discussion of the Grands Ecoles and the French method of re-
cruiting young graduates to high positions).
152. Interview with members of ART, in Pars, France (Dec. 8, 2004); interviews with members of
France Telecoms, in Paris, France (Jan. 5, 31,2005).
153. After the writing of this paper, I came across a small number of U.S. government blogs. For
example, the Department of Transportation created a blog in April 2008, which can be found at
http://fastlane.dot.gov/. The Transportation Security Administration has a blog, found at
http://www.tsa.gov/blog/. Both of these are newer than the French blog, and their existence supports
the suggestion that this new method has promise as a way to increase access.
154. See JONAH D. LEVY, TOCQUEVILLE'S REVENGE: STATE, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMY IN
CONTEMPORARY FRANCE (1999). Even with more recent reforms giving more powers to local gov-
ernment, the relationship with the center is a sensitive issue. See, e.g., Bernard Bizet, Deconcentration
versus Decentralisation of Administration in France: a Centre-Periphery Dilemma, 25 CAN. J.
REGIONAL Sci. 475 (2002).
155. Blog de I'&tuipe Collectivit6s, http://www.art-telecom.fr/index.php?id=2201 (last visited July
20-25, 2008). The blog seems to be inactive in the last few months, though it was very active at first.
156. Autoritd de regulation des communications dlectroniques et des postes (ARCEP),
http://www.arcep.fr/index.php?id=l (follow "Actualitds" hyperlink on left side of page) (last visited
Oct. 26, 2009).
157. Universal Services refers to allowing all citizens access to a telecommunications network for an
affordable fee. Universal service includes geographic leveling (preventing prices in remote, rural areas
from being substantially higher than those in urban areas) as well as special programs for low income
consumers and special equipment for consumers with disabilities. For a more detailed discussion, see
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which two agency representatives, Galle Nguyen and St6phane Kuna, responded
to customers' questions.
158
These chats, like the blog, serve at least two purposes. First, they promote the
information flow as the authority answers questions and thus compensates for
problems with the agency's materials on its Web site-gaps in such material or
areas where it is hard to understand. The agency also receives direct communica-
tions from consumers about their questions and concerns. But in addition to that,
the chats and the blog, by providing direct response and an interface for citizens
with questions, increase the agency's transparency and responsiveness to concern.
Both mechanisms, therefore, have the potential to increase the agency's legitima-
cy.
To what degree that potential will be realized depends not only on the execu-
tion of these projects (for example, the chats and blog), but also on things the
agency cannot control, such as the public's attitude to government in general and
the level of trust in what the agency says. But chats and blogs and similar elec-
tronic communications can certainly contribute to the accuracy, comprehensive-
ness and timeliness of information given by an agency. "
9
B. Swedish Municipal Advisors
Another mechanism that has no parallel in the United States,' 60 and that has
the potential to improve citizen satisfaction with and trust in government in the
United States, is the use of municipal-level advisors in Sweden. Municipal au-
thorities in Sweden have, for some time, utilized municipal advisors. 16' These
officials' job description is answering citizens' concerns. The citizen can ap-
proach them with any question about government operation and receive aid in
interacting with government, but they are not limited to questions about managing
government. The example I was presented with was that they can ask for advice
about which brand of toaster to buy, and the advisor will answer to the best of
their ability. 
162
After the liberalization of the energy market was accompanied by problems
around consumer switching, as mentioned above, the government initiated, in
Dorit Reiss, Agency Accountability Strategies After Liberalization: Universal Service in the United
Kingdom, France, and Sweden, 31 L. & POL'Y 111, 118-119 (2009).
158. ARCEP, Script du chat sur 'annuarie universel du 5 juillet 2007 avec Gaelle Nguyen, respon-
sable du service universel, et Strphane Kuna, responsable consommateurs A I'ARCEP (July 5, 2007),
available at http://www.ARCEP.fr/fileadmin/reprise/chat/script-chat-annuaire-050707.pdf.
159. An interesting question that is unclear from the agency's Web site is whether what is said by the
agency's representative under these circumstances creates an estoppel, i.e., whether it binds the agen-
cy. This discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. Regardless, electronic communications
offer a way to improve connections between citizens and government that seems underused in most
agencies.
160. Aside from the situation mentioned by the conference participant mentioned above, which she
presented as a temporary measure.
161. Interview with members of the Swedish Consumer Agency, in Stockholm, Sweden (Sept. 22,
2004); interview with a member of the electricity advice bureau, in Stockholm, Sweden (Oct. 4, 2004).
162. Interview with a consumer representative working for one of Sweden's electricity companies, in
Stockholm, Sweden (the name of the company has been withheld to protect the identity of the repre-
sentative) (Oct. 13, 2004); interview with members of the Swedish Consumer Agency, in Stockholm,
Sweden (Sept. 22, 2004).
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addition to the regular advisor, the creation of the Swedish municipal advisors for
energy.' 63 These advisors' job is to provide up-to-date, competent information.
Municipalities receive government subsidies to help finance them, and the energy
regulator helps train them.164 This is what the Swedish energy agency said about
these advisors:
Every year some 150,000 households visit their local energy advisor.
There is a local energy advisor in each Swedish municipality, providing
free, impartial advice on how to save energy on a day-to-day basis and on
heating systems for homes. ... A 2006 survey shows that [40 percent] of
visitors considered the municipal advice service their most important
channel of energy information. One in seven visitors said that the advice
had been a very important factor in their purchasing decisions and in-
vestments. 
65
The advisors-the general advisors and the energy ones-not only advise
consumers but also insert the questions they are asked and the answers they pro-
vide into a national database (a non-published one) managed by the consumer
agency.' 66 The effect is three-fold. First, the national agency can provide quality
control and correct answers. Second, if there are recurring questions, municipal
advisors can benefit from each others' experience, which both saves them from
researching an answer themselves and provides consistency. Finally, if there are
recurring questions, the concentration in a unified database allows the consumer
agency to identify and address widespread problems or simply things that are not
clear. They can then raise those issues with the relevant regulator and work to-
gether to solve them.
In terms of participation, the municipal advisors have the potential of achiev-
ing the same two goals as the electronic communications mentioned above, in
somewhat different ways. First, they increase the information available both to
citizens and to government. They can compensate for shortcomings in govern-
ment provision of information and let government actors know which problems
are salient for their citizens.
However, just as important is their legitimacy-building effect. The ability to
approach a government official and receive answers to questions or help in navi-
gating complex bureaucratic structures, and at least be listened to, has the poten-
tial to build trust in government (providing, of course, that the municipal advisors
are reasonably competent and service-oriented; in Sweden, substantial care is
163. For more information, see The Swedish Consumer Electricity Advice Bureau Summary in Eng-
lish, http://www.elradgivningsbyran.se/artike/article.asp?-tp-article-id=109&avd=ART-0OS (last
visited Oct. 27, 2009).
164. Swedish Energy Agency, Improving Energy Efficiency, http://www.energimyndigheten.se/
en/About-us/Mission/Energy-efficiency/ (last visited Nov. 1I, 2009).
165. See Swedish Energy Agency, http://www.swedishenergyagency.selWEB/STEMExOlEng.nsf/
F_PreGen0l?ReadForm&MenuSelect=89010EFFE48IBC80CI25739800280AOE (last visited Sept.
14, 2009).
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taken to ensure they are well trained). 167 The existence of these advisors may be
one of the reasons there is a relatively high level of trust in government in Swe-
den. 16
8
Both of these participation approaches--the municipal advisors and the elec-
tronic communications--have potential to improve interactions between citizens
and government and should at least be considered by other countries.
VI. CONCLUSION
As shown above, these six agencies have made substantial efforts to provide
for citizen participation in decision-making, albeit at varying levels and through
various mechanisms. 169 However, the degree of actual citizen participation in
decision-making is still not completely clear.
First, as described above, individual citizens are not often interested in partic-
ipating in the regulation of utilities unless there is a crisis, especially since such
participation requires substantial investment of time and effort to understand the
complex technical issues involved. Even generalized consumer organizations
devote only limited attention to them. Second, since these countries have been
experimenting with participation in these sectors for a relatively short time, they
are still in the process of experimenting with approaches already tested in the
United States. The agencies are promoting participation through comments on
policy documents, while in the United States that kind of participation has been
strongly criticized by those addressing the rulemaking process (though it is still
the most common form of participation). 170 All six agencies put substantial effort
into learning the views and preferences of stakeholders. However, since they
started from a decision-making process that involved a very small number of ac-
tors, the growth in the number of participants has been gradual. Also, mirroring
the same developments in the United States, the number of citizens actively par-
ticipating is very small compared to industry participation, and the level of re-
sources available to consumer organizations is very limited.
On the other hand, these countries have made substantial changes to partici-
pation. Decisions are now made in a much more transparent manner, and in all of
the countries there is an opportunity to participate for all citizens. If in the past
the agencies approached participation from the point of view of a much more
centralized and dominant system of public administration, very strong compared
to both local authorities and other branches of government, today they make use
of intermediate bodies, such as consumer agencies and advisors, as well as me-
chanisms aimed directly at citizens, such as the online consultations.
Finally, one development that this paper does not directly address but that
may affect the participation situation is the increase of litigation in telecommuni-
cations and electricity in the three countries. More and more, industry (and some
167. 1 do not have information on the level of services they provide, but my interactions with other
government official would lead me to expect courteous, efficient services.
168. This high level of trust exists even now, in spite of claims of a crisis of legitimacy. See Pierre,
supra note 50.
169. See Fung, supra note 4 (discussing different levels of participation).
170. CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE
POLICY 180-181 (3d ed., 2003).
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citizens) turns to the courts when it is dissatisfied with regulatory decisions. In
participation terms, this means that there is strong pressure on the agencies to be
transparent and to review and explain their decisions and review of such deci-
sions. 171 It also provides another forum for private actors to influence citizens'
decisions, although whether such a forum-litigation--has positive or negative
benefits, or no impact at all, on public administration is a hotly debated topic.
172
171. Martin Shapiro, The Giving-Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179 (1992).
172. See generally CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF THE BUREAUCRACY (1990); ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN
WAY OF LAW (2003); Martin Shapiro, Judicial Delegation Doctrines: the U.S., Britain, and France, 25
W. EUR. POL. 173 (2002); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY-WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO
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